

National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism
Ministry of Security and Justice

Business as (un)usual

Resilience of Critical Infrastructure

Unclassified - for official use only

Outline

1. About the NCTV
2. What is Critical Infrastructure?
3. Risks to Critical infrastructures
4. Solutions and tools for CIP
5. Tool: Public private cooperation
6. Solution: From protection to resilience: CIP revisited
7. Future on CIP: working together

1. About the National Coordinator

Mission statement

- The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) helps to keep The Netherlands safe and stable by identifying threats and strengthening the resilience and protection of vital interests.
- The purpose is to prevent or minimise societal disruption.

Main tasks

- Identifying/analysing and reducing threats and risks
- Providing surveillance and protection for persons, property, services, events and vital sectors
- Expanding and strengthening cyber security
- Resilience of locations, individuals, sectors and networks
- Effective crisis management and crisis communication

Critical Infrastructures

In the **Netherlands**

Critical infrastructure is the infrastructure which can cause societal disruption in case of discontinuity of service.

12 critical infrastructure sectors, 33 products and services have been defined.

In the **European Union**, based on the EPCIP directive

Critical infrastructure: the physical and information technology facilities, networks, services and assets that, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of governments in EU countries.

2 European critical infrastructure sectors: transport and energy

Dutch national Critical Infrastructure

2009
Telecom/ICT
Energy (Electricity, Gas, Oil)
Finance (payments and securities)
Drinking water supplies
Public administration
Law and order
Transport (airports, railways)
Dikes
Food supplies
Health
Public order and safety
Nuclear and chemical industry

Risks (1)


Catastrophic
Very serious
Serious
Substantial
Limited
Highly unlikely
Unlikely
Moderately likely
Likely
Highly likely
Worst-credible coastal flood
Dyke Ring 14 flood
Weapons control in a failed state
Malicious prolonged electricity failure
Mass polarisation
Criminal subversion of vital businesses
Nuclear incident
IP network failure (ICT)
Manipulation of public administration
Cyber espionage
Severe influenza pandemic
Confrontation between ethnic minorities and extreme right
Geopolitical oil supply crisis
Rhine-IJssel flood
Widespread unrest
Mineral shortages
Malicious power supply failure
Cyber conflict
Shipping accident
Unrest in problem neighbourhoods
Severe snowstorm
Animal rights extremism
Satellite disruption
Muslim extremism
Black ice
Crisis outside the EU
Exogenic jihadist threat
National power failure
Malicious ICT disruption in critical sector
Chemical incident
Cyber hacktivism
Rail crash
Malicious gas supply failure
Unrest regarding Salafism
Very severe storm
Food shortages – soya beans
Wildfire
Animal rights activism
Right-wing extremism
Violent loner
Extreme heat and drought
Mild influenza pandemic
Left-wing extremism
Manipulation of share market
Internet exchange failure

Risks (2)

- Natural



- Man-made
  - Non-malicious

Risks (3)

- Man-made – Malicious:
  - Relevant trends in terrorist threats to CIP in Western World:
  - Most incidents in jihadist conflict area's of little relevance
    - Civil aviation clear exception
  - Top down vs bottom-up
    - Intention driven vs capability driven
  - Resilience vs target-substitution
  - Resilience: is the insider threat more relevant

Cyber: a virtual and vital society



•Cyber as a “gamechanger”

- Profit-sector: chances and opportunities
- Government: new role, enabling coalitions
- Citizens:
  - need for (improved) checks and balances
  - privacy versus individual responsibility

- 3 trends:
  Big data, Hyper connectivity, Disappearing borders

Solutions and tools for CIP

- National security policies include CIP
- Clear responsibility division is necessary: primary responsibility lies with the CI owner or operator
- Public private cooperation
- Knowing and doing: what is CI, what can happen and what can we do?
- Sharing information, preparing for crisis and alerting CI

The Netherlands' national security policies

- National Security Strategy
  - including National Risk Assessment

- National Counterterrorism Strategy
  - including National Terrorism Threat Assessment

- National Cybersecurity Strategy
  - including National Cybersecurity Assessment

- All-hazards, comprehensive, multidisciplinary approach to CIP

Public private cooperation

- 80 % of CI is privately owned
- PPC is fundamental to effective CIP
- Example of PPC: Alerting system Counter terrorism:
  - Commitment of critical infrastructures to implement agreed measurements in case of a certain threat level
  - Commitment of government to provide all necessary information and to alert when anything relevant occurs.

Knowing and doing: the CIP approach in the Netherlands

Assessment of Criticality
Identification of critical PROCESSES

Assessment of vulnerabilities, risks and threats
Based on standing law, regulations and assessments

Roadmaps
SMART use and/or development of instruments

Step 1 Assessment of Criticality

Criteria

- Economic impact = costs and damage to economy
- Physical impact = number of deaths and severely injured
- Societal impact = fear, anger, disturbance

2009
Telecom/ICT
Energy (Electricity, Gas, Oil)
Finance (payments and securities)
Drinking water supplies
Public administration
Law and order
Transport (airports, railways)
Dikes
Food supplies
Health
Public order and safety
Nuclear and chemical industry



Step 2 and 3. Consequences of 2014 revision

from CI Protection to CI Resilience



2015 and beyond: Need for a common framework

- Cross sectoral dependencies – also cross boundary dependencies
- Explore „new" sectors, processes, capabilities
- Develop „Capabilities catalogue" for use in crisis situations

- Working further on the European Program of CIP

QUESTIONS?